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POLITICAL APPRENTICESHIP 
HE hatreds that multiplied during the colonial period, T the wide separation and intense jealousy of the classes, 
-between the peninsular Spaniards and the Creoles, between 
the latter and the mestizos,-and the contempt of all for 
the native Indian,-these were an adequate preparation for 
the convulsion that took place throughout Spanish America 
between I 8 I O  and I 823.  I t  is not to  be supposed, however, 
that the war for independence was uninspired by the move- 
ments that  culminated in the American and French revolu- 
tions. T h e  new doctrines of human rights based on 
equality were greedily accepted in these exploited countries. 
T h e  leadership centering in Bolivar was cradled in the 
tumultuous changes that had taken place in Europe. I t  was, 
in a sense, a t  once real and theoretical, a struggle for 
liberty. 
In  the countries where the new order of things was being 
established, among the liberals of the United States, Eng- 
land, and France, expectation ran high. I t  seemed then 
that nothing was necessary but to throw off the yoke of 
despotism and release the energies of a people for it to move 
instantly and continuously toward the realization of a 
beneficent purpose. T h e  protection of the United States 
against any move by the monarchies of Europe to  interfere 
with the new order was a t  once accorded. Liberty seemed 
a thing of magical potency. T h e  political machinery de- 
vised in the United States seemed an adequate vehicle fo r  
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the new national life, and was therefore almost universally 
adopted. 
T h e  world now, a century older, smiles a t  the uncritical 
confidence of those days in the effects of liberty. Freedom 
from previous restraint, we now know, accomplishes nothing 
by itself. T h e  released energies of man may not be benefi- 
cent. In  any case, the chances are  that movement from 
the moment when freedom is gained will, for  a time, be 
backward instead of forward. T h e  political organization 
of European nations was, at  bottom, an elaboration of 
tribal authority into despotic control. T h e  middle term was 
the necessity for  defense and the dissolution of tribal life 
under military organization. If in any European country, 
where the kingship was establishing itself, this national au- 
thority had been suddenly removed, it is probable that there 
would have come a reversion to the more ancient arrange- 
ments and modes of control by custom. O r  we can see the 
matter in another way. Suppose an individual, subject 
to restraint for  a long period, suddenly endowed with free- 
dom. W h a t  does he d o ?  Pretty much what he was doing 
before if  conditions permit the continued exercise of habit. 
Change will be in the direction of securing satisfactions 
through the unconscious determination of custom. T h e  
story of liberated slaves is familiar. T h e  machinery of law 
might be suspended in any one of our cities. T h e  majority 
of citizens would go on doing what they were doing before. 
All married people might be suddenly divorced. T h e  
majority would proceed to marry the same persons again. 
T h e  acquisition of freedom permits change, but does not in- 
sure it, and it is far  from being able to make the change one 
of advancement. 
Again, so f a r  as Latin America is concerned, the perspec- 
tive of a century makes it clear that  the expected result 
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could not possibly have come about. In  the United States 
self-government had been evolved from the beginning of 
colonial history. In  England extensions of a democratic 
order took place only as different groups evolved in their 
thinking and administrative training to the point of making 
them successful. T h e  general rule is that any sweeping 
political change can be effective only if  the people have al- 
ready served an apprenticeship in preparation for  it. Other- 
wise the new order will be only the old with new labels. 
T h e  imperial rigime in Russia may be stripped away in any 
moment. But a people accustomed only to that kind of 
rule will evolve the same thing with different names and 
persons, and the program of liberty will continue to be car- 
ried out in talk and aspiration. W e  have lately deluded our- 
selves with a belief in the efficacy of liberty in the small 
nations of central and eastern Europe. T h e  case is very sim- 
ilar to that of the Spanish American countries of a century 
ago. So f a r  as immediate results are concerned, all revolu- 
tion is futile beyond the destruction of despotism. Political 
growth is subject to the same slow-acting formula as all 
other growth. This  comes from the very nature of gov- 
ernment. Democracy is distinctive in that it enables the 
individuals of a population to discover among themselves 
plans of action and to  modify the machinery of government 
to carry these plans into effect. There  is unity of purpose 
issuing in policy and a program of action. This  unity of the 
future, which is the basis of democratic life, requires educa- 
tion, freedom of discussion, and a voice in the conduct of 
affairs. But there is a whole other side to government. I t  
must be adequate to carry out the policy intended to guide 
its course. I n  other words, it must be a firmly established, 
going concern. This  requirement can only be met by the 
possession of numbers of persons trained to the duties of 
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administration. And administration in general must have 
a consistency and certainty of action which forbid a rapid 
change. This  firmness is usually expressed as principles of 
government. Every democracy involves a conflict between 
principles and ideals. Administrators, for the most part, 
want t o  remain undisturbed in carrying out routine duties. 
Anything that upsets their arrangements is considered a 
violation of some fundamental principle. On  the other 
hand, those who believe themselves able to decide what gov- 
ernment ought to do, insist upon the necessity of breaking 
red tape and even destroying the Supreme Court in order 
that  their wishes may be immediately realized. 
Latin America from the beginning and throughout its 
history has filled half the specifications of democratic gov- 
ernment. I t - h a s  had no lack of idealism, of discussion, of 
policies, and of plans. It has failed because it had no ma- 
chinery strong enough to carry out these plans. Constitu- 
tional principles were adopted as ideals to be attained rather 
than settled methods of governmental procedure. I t  is im- 
portant to keep this distinction clearly in mind. Democratic 
self-government cannot be enacted, in Persia, o r  the Philip- 
pines, o r  anywhere else. Mere  idealistic radicalism arrives 
in a windy chaos. Its necessary vehicle is the conservatism 
of practised and effective administration. 
T h e  expectation that the Spanish American colonies, 
freed from control by Spain, would speedily evolve 
democratic nationality was therefore wholly unwarranted. 
Other nations more advantageously placed had required 
long periods of preparation for  even a limited change in 
their political institutions. T h e  advance made during the 
past century is not only creditable, it is astonishing. T h e  
fact that constitutions modeled on that of the United States 
were adopted, and the name of Republic assumed, had 
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nothing to do with the situation except to polarize aspira- 
tion and set a goal for  future attainment. What ,  then, 
actually happened? Remember that there had been no 
training of the native population in the functions of govern- 
ment. T h e  different localities possessed deliberative bodies, 
but skill in administration was non-existent. Wi th  the re- 
moval of restraint, those elements became dominant which 
had become fixed in the social order of the preceding period, 
modified to  some extent by existing circumstances. W h a t  
were these factors? 
T h e  tribal organization of the native races has already 
been noticed. I t  involved control by chiefs, functioning 
through customary law aided by religious beliefs. This  na- 
tive chieftainship had never been entirely lost among the 
Indians. Indeed, it is perpetuated to the present day. 
Wherever the Indian element is found in strength, one will 
discover the authority of the cacique. I t  had proved an 
instrument of value to  the Spaniards. Tribal heads could 
be made responsible for the conduct and work of their 
subordinates. All of this means that large sections of the 
people were habituated to a form of personal control and 
to  the focus of their loyalties into support of personal leader- 
ship. 
T h e  real contribution of Spain to the life of the New 
World  was the feudal type of social order. I t  was based 
here as elsewhere on the ownership of large tracts of land. 
If a few men are able to secure all the available land and 
enforce their claim to its possession, they can naturally dic- 
tate the conditions of living to all others whose opportunity 
to  exist depends upon the use of land. This  dictation usually 
takes the form of collecting a portion of the proceeds of 
labor-that portion known as rent, T h e  whole system de- 
pends upon the ability of owners to enforce their rights of 
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possession. As a general rule, these rights are the fruits of 
conquest, the vanquished population becoming one of serfs. 
I n  course of time, as the distance between conqueror and 
conquered diminishes, this order of things secures a cus- 
tomary acceptance, and often the strongest supporters of 
feudalism have been the serfs themselves. A movement for  
freedom almost never begins with slaves, serfs, o r  the 
renters of property. Despite the fact that most revolutions 
in the past have had the character of agrarian revolts, their 
initiation has nearly always been from without. An agri- 
cultural population may be very violent when once set in 
action, but its normal tendency is to accept social conditions 
as it accepts those of climate, and to preserve what it be- 
lieves to be security. When the Spanish armies were driven 
out of the New World,  they did not take with them their 
universally established social order-that of widely distin- 
guished classes and the ownership by single persons of ex- 
tensive lands. As industry has been insignificant, and com- 
merce of late growth in all these countries, their economic 
basis has been one of agriculture, and the whole period since 
the war for  independence has not been sufficient to uproot 
the old order. T o  this day throughout Latin America the 
land is held and worked under the plantation system. H e r e  
and there will survive something of the old Indian com- 
munism, but the encroachments made upon this have served, 
not the development of peasant ownership, but a further 
assimilation into the large estates. Naturally, in the feudal 
order, the person of importance is the overlord. H e  can 
compel service or  give privileges and thus purchase loyalty. 
Leadership again proves to be of a personal type, based 
upon purely local and individual sanctions. 
I t  was out of this material that democratic nationality 
was expected to grow. T h e  reason for  disappointment is 
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sufficiently obvious now. T h e  United States had to  face and 
solve a similar problem. T h e  system of small farms con- 
fronted the system of great estates, based on slavery, ap- 
plied to the mono-culture of cotton or  tobacco. T h a t  the 
southern states were democratic in any general sense is more 
than a pretension. No one can deny that all the standards 
of democratic equality can be maintained within the limits 
of a class. T h e  most democratic group in the world is the 
British peerage. T h e  southern estate owners were democra- 
tic in a similar fashion. 
T h e  political consequences of feudalism flow from its es- 
sential character. If a country is controlled by a few great 
families, its political arrangements will be matters of family 
alliance. Domination will be that of persons sustained by 
family connections. There  can be no such thing as free 
choice of policy, or a division in terms of principle. One 
will seek in vain to discover what political principle divides 
blancos from colorados, and encounter astonishment at the 
suggestion that principle has anything to  d o  with the con- 
duct of government. T h e  other side, one is told, consists 
merely of rascals and hereditary enemies who are  operating 
the government for  their own benefit. They  must, there- 
fore, be turned out and one’s own friends and relatives 
placed in office. This  view of politics may seem primitive 
and even childish, but it is the consequence of the universally 
prevalent feudal conditions. 
Imagine, therefore, the state of affairs a t  the end of 
Spanish rule. Administration had been of a character t o  
develop no organic unity. T h e  parts out of which nations 
were to be constructed had been held together mechanically. 
Such loyalty as existed was local, o r  a t  least provincial. 
Even the unity of military effort necessary to defeat the 
Spanish armies was hard to  secure. Behind the solid front 
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created by such disinterested patriots as San Martin, bicker- 
ings and jealousies were the order of the day. Only a few 
men of extraordinary greatness of character were able to 
rise above dissension. After the war  for independence, a 
struggle that was long, bitter, and cruel, these countries, rep- 
resenting the former administrative divisions, had as their 
political assets-the raw materials out of which national 
governments were to be created-a series of little chieftains, 
each supported by his band of followers, representative only 
of his own locality, filled with tribal ambitions and hostilities, 
capable, therefore, of uniting his authority only to an ar- 
rangement that would save it from being impaired. T h e  
result could only be a tribal confederation, liable to dissolve 
through jealousy o r  the promise of greater advantage in 
another combination. T h e  next stage was the effort by the 
more prominent chiefs so to manipulate this changing set of 
alliances as to arrive a t  supreme power. A leader could 
only hold the reins of government by force created through 
rewards to those supporting him, and through correspond- 
ing intimidation and persecution of those in opposition. 
Naturally the latter conspired and assembled resources to 
turn the office-holding group out of power. This could only 
be done through violence. T h e  type of revolution for  which 
Latin American countries are  famous is nothing more than 
a change of parties,-a kind of military election. T h e  at- 
tempt to forbid revolution is about as intelligent as an at- 
tempt to forbid the rain. I t  follows upon certain conditions 
and will disappear when the conditions are altered. T h e  
conception of government that obtained until recent years 
in these countries was based upon personal strength and 
influence, reward of personal followers through the privilege 
of enriching themselves in a short period as their Spanish 
predecessors had done. N o t  only was corruption tolerated, 
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it was the normal and expected order of things. T h e  only 
question was as to  who should be privileged to  milk the 
There  is, after all, no essential difference between our 
professional politician and the soldier politician of Latin 
America. As soon as our great parties had found their align- 
ment it became worth somebody’s while to hold the reins of 
party organization for the purpose of securing office and 
the privilege of using that office for selfish purposes. Our  
bosses are not troubled about principles and are concerned 
only to win. Once in office o r  in control of office-holders, it 
is possible to levy contributions upon all kinds of business. 
Direct robbery of the treasury would be too crude and is, 
after all, unnecessary. Our  history of bossism illustrates 
the working of a political force, so fa r  inseparable from 
popular government. Merely conceive parties organized 
for  a trial by physical force instead of a count of ballots, 
place generals and their subordinates in the position of pro- 
fessional politicians, and the results are much the same, with 
perhaps the advantage in dramatic quality lying with the 
practitioners of violence. T h e  disadvantage lies in the 
greater ruthlessness, the confiscations, political assassina- 
tions, and the inevitable demoralization. But just as the 
great mass of people in this country have nothing to do 
with political bosses, except to be drawn through one pre- 
tense o r  another into their machinations, so the Latin 
American populations have little to  do  with the conspiracies 
of their generals. Military service during revolutionary 
disturbance is usually pressed, and the people have to bear 
the brunt of this kind of change of government. 
Wi th  some differences in the case of Chile, where the 
feudal barons were able to  maintain a general agreement, 
and where the fight for  independence was not so bitter, it 
cow. 
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may be said that each Spanish American country passed a 
generation in warfare  among its petty chieftains. Nation- 
hood did not exist; governmental power was merely secured 
only to be lost immediately. And when stability did arrive, 
it had the character of the previous conditions. One 
Caudillo merely succeeded in maintaining his authority 
against all other contestants. It was of course necessary 
that he should develop an element of power apart  from un- 
certain alliances with influential leaders. This  meant the 
building up and controlling of a national army with loyal- 
ties detached from localities and their feudal chiefs. H e r e  
was the basis of the dictatorship. Once secure through 
military strength, it could count upon the powerful support 
of the Church. Militarism and ecclesiasticism are  the right 
and left arms of every dictatorship. 
T h e  second generation of Spanish American development 
was characterized by the conditions just described. I n  Ar- 
gentina, the tyrant Rosas was the example. In  the case of 
Mexico the story of Santa Anna is familiar. Apparently, 
those countries in which a single dictatorship maintained it- 
self for a long period were the fortunate ones. There  was 
some training in administration, badly as it was carried out ;  
there was some opportunity to develop commercial organiza- 
tion which prefers the security of the strong hand to  the 
wavering mercies of popular control. Now and then, a 
Caudillo used his power for  the good of his country. But 
the long continuance of the dictatorship did not alter its 
character. I t  was rule through force, always resented as 
oppressive. N o r  was it possible completely to eliminate 
provincial leaders ; these were always prepared to seize any 
opportunity that would give scope to their personal ambi- 
tions. But after a long-continued dictatorship, no minor 
chieftain could succeed merely on the program of replacing 
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the tyrant. T h e  only motive that could gather strength 
among the masses was the desire for freedom. Any new 
insurrectory movement had, therefore, to  promise liberty to 
the people in terms of the constitution. In  this manner the 
overthrow of Rosas was the beginning of constitutional de- 
velopment in Argentina. Equally, the triumph of Juarez 
meant a new order in Mexico. In  the latter case, the French 
intervention destroyed the chances of early constitutional 
development, and threw the country back into another period 
of dictatorship under Diaz which continued until recent 
years. T h e  last revolution was successful because it, too, 
was fought under the banner of constitutionalism. 
In  the other and smaller nations, the attainment of gov- 
ernment was longer deferred. In  most of these cases no 
change has taken place in the general character of their 
social organization. T h e  expansion of commerce and in- 
dustry requires and fosters an element in the population dif- 
ferent from those found in the owners and serfs of a plan- 
tation system. Democracy seemed a t  first devised to  meet 
the needs of a population of small, working, land-owning 
farmers. Its. ultimate operations seem to depend for effec- 
tiveness upon an industrial order. Some of the states of 
Latin America have, to  this day, little commerce and less 
industry. T h e  old relationships therefore continue, and 
with them government by persons and families, and, con- 
sequently, dictatorships and revolutions. 
T h e  stages found in the progress from personal to popular 
government are so faithfully repeated in the history of each 
of these countries as almost to  follow a formula, a t  any 
rate to  argue a close similarity of factors and conditions. 
I t  might have been expected that Cuba would have proved 
an exception. Wi th  independence attained when it was pos- 
sible to  profit by the mistakes of other countries, with a 
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national career auspiciously projected with the help of the 
United States, there was every reason to hope that an en- 
lightened citizenship after worse than its share of despotism, 
aided by great economic interests and with the protection 
of its constitution assured by the Platt  Amendment, would 
escape the quagmires of personal government. But the 
presidential elections of recent years show the same align- 
ment of groups bound by personal and family affiliations, 
the same absence of contest of principle, the same use of 
governmental power to prevent a fair  election, the same 
cynical disregard of the constitution that fill the old sad 
story of nationhood in its birth throes of all the sister re- 
publics. All that  can be said is that  too many of the same 
forces and conditions were present to permit escape from 
the consequences. It is a lesson, too, for  those Americans 
who imagine that the beneficent tutelage of this country 
can confer immunity to reversionary tendencies, and secure 
the integrity of democratic institutions. These seem to be 
matters of growth from within, and no outside artificer, 
however skilful, can greatly change their form, or  inject 
into them other than their own native spirit. 
